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This study begins with a brief discussion of influences shaping the development of industrial relations systems in France,
Italy and Spain in the light of labor movement models proposed by Sturmthal and Scoville and by Lipset. It then turns
to the early development of the complex systems of compensation found there, as well as im plications fo r the gene rality
of the Dunlop -Rothbau m hypoth esis. Against this backdro p, it proceeds to a detailed discussion of compensation systems
in the three  countries.  
INTRODUCTION
Francois  Sellier, speak ing to the faculty  and students at Illinois a numb er of years ago , outlined the p rincipal facets
of a European “Latin Model of Industrial Relations” to be observed in France, Italy and Spain. This model featured (at
least historically in the ca se of Spain)  an ideolog ically fissured labor movement characterized by competing labor parties
each with a companion union federation and constituent unions, weak institutions of collective bargaining, and
considera ble state involvem ent in the determin ation of eco nomic ou tcomes.  In ad dition, Italy and Spain were laggards
in the process of economic growth which transformed Western Europe after the year 1800, while France remained more
heavily rural than other early develope rs.
The process of evolution of the labor movements in the three countries can be examined through the lens of two
closely related modelings: that of Sturmthal and Scoville (1973) and the later formulation by Lipset (1983-5).  Sturmthal
and Scoville wo uld stress the political and social disabilities which faced the work ing classes and the labor mo vements,
especially  in Spain and  Italy, and the consequent need  for the pursuit of political means to achieve p olitical objectives,
as shaping the g oals and fun ctions of these m ovemen ts.  At the same tim e, loose lab or marke ts meant that eco nomic
objectives could rarely be achieved by economic actions (like collective bargaining) , thus discoura ging its develo pment.
If we accept Sellier’s evidence (1973) of tight labor markets in France, we  may have a case  of “French e xceptiona lism,”
where bargaining institutions did not develop for the simple reason that the French state was so responsive to workers’
political action that this turne d out to be  the more p roductive r oute for labo r to pursue.  It is p ossible that the e arly
tradition in France of state intervention in labor problems (exemplified by the creation of conseils de prud’hommes in
1806)  may be a m odel for the o ther Latin cou ntries in some k ind of spillove r effect. 
The Lipset view deals with much the same variables in a different way.  Lipset speaks of the attainment of “political
citizenship” — and “economic citizenship” — b ut with much less  direct focus o n how these tw o are achie ved.  A
Lipsetian view of the three countries would see the French working class having achieved p olitical citizenship  early
through the Revolution, but only firmed up in the 1870 s with growth o f public, secula r education .  In Italy and Spain,
both  politica l citizenship and  econom ic citizenship ca me very late.  
HISTORICAL ORIGINS
Interventionism in historical perspective
In the saga of uneven ind ustrial develo pment in W estern Euro pe, a few num bers will help u s place the L atin
countries relative to others in the parade across the historical stage.  Table 1 draws on Martin (1990) and Neufeld (1961)
to show the positions of the Latin Three and the Industrial Big Two around 1910 and 1920.  Table 2 shows similar
figures assembled from various sources by Clark (1960), but for a longer period of time.  Both tables reveal the extent
of Latin lateness in the development procession.
Table 1 .  Percen t of Lab or For ce in Indu stry, 191 0/1 and  1920/1
Spain Italy France Germany Great Britain
1910 15.82 1911 26.9 39.2 50.6 46.7
1920 21.94 1921 24.3 36.6 48.9 50.1
Sources: Spain—Martin, p. 177; others—Neufeld, p. 527.
Table 2. Per cent of Lab or Force in In dustry, variou s years.
Spain Italy France Germany Great Britain
1887         6?*
1891                                                                                                           
1900        11.3     
1901 32.9
1907 37.7
1910        11.1     
1911 34.6
1920        17.4     
1921 38.7
1925 39.5
1930        27.5     
1931 35.0
1936 29.8 25.5
1940        19.4
1946 28.1 39.4
1951 39.5
*Rough guess by present authors based on stability of mini ng and constructi on shares in employmen t in 1900 and 191 0 Clark’s figure is for mining,
industry and construction combined.     
Source: Clark, appe ndix Table III.
In addition, we  note that Rostow sets forth “tentative approximate take-off dates” which confirm the employment
distributions of Tables 1  and 2.  Although F rance (18 30-186 0) is second  only to Britain  (1783-1 802) in its take -off,
neither of the other Latin countries makes the list (Rostow, 1960:38).
As we shall see below (in section 3), the contemporary pay and benefits systems in the three countries are quite
complex.  But certain central features, common to all three countries, go back a long way and  owe their intro duction to
state intervention.  A s the old saw g oes: it wasn’t the so cialists or the social d emocrats w ho created  social insuranc e, it
was Otto von BismarckCin an pre-emptive strike against possible focal issues for labor unrest.  Thus, although the
systems show some signs of change, for many years they shared commo n elements, p articularly in the area we would term
“benefits.”   All three historically had largely state-run health systems, generally with low taxes on workers as compared
to employers; all three have state-run pension systems; all three have mandated b onus systems aimed at worke rs’ seasonal
cash crunches and  hav e family allowance systems.
Taking recognition of these facts has some broader theoretical implications.  Years ago, Dunlop and Rothbaum
(1955) contende d from their e xamination  of comp arative evide nce that the num ber of com ponents to  the compensation
package became more numerous and complex as the process of economic development went forward: the so-called
“Dunlop -Rothbau m Hypo thesis.”
Some years later, as a result of research published in Scoville (1969), Scoville tended to argue in seminars and
classes that the ill-develop ed nature o f product m arkets, transpo rtation systems, etc . might yield th e complex set of
compensation practices he found in late-60s Afghanistan.  Thus, he conjectured, perhaps the number of compensation
compo nents behaved in a U-shaped fashion over the course of development.  At first, food allowances (either in kind
or cash) for critica l items, transpo rtation service s, some hea lth care, lunches and provident funds might b e provide d to
offset market failures or weaknesses.  Then, as markets for these goods and services improved or became less prone to
sharp price fluctuations (for wage goods, for example), these components would be commu ted to cash.  Later on, the
proliferation of components would appear, as Dunlop and Rothbaum argued.
The Latin case sug gests a pattern  where the co mpensatio n packag e becom es comp lex early on d ue to state
recogniti on of a “labor problem,” and consequent intervention.  Follower countries learn from others’ experience.
Perhaps the Dunlop-Rothbaum hypothesis applied only to the country with nobody to follow (Great Britain) and its near-
clone in labor policy (the US).  Pe rhaps the D unlop-Ro thbaum hyp othesis is an Anglo-S axon od dity, not paralle led in
the experience of later-industrializing nations.
The passage o f legislation relating to  benefits is chro nicled in  Table 3.  France , being the earliest of the Latin T rio
to industrialize, tend s to be first, with Italy  and Spain following generally fairly close behind.  There are some exceptions
to the pattern, but the evidence for precocious interventionism is seen most clearly for Spain, passing old age pension
legislation when barely one-tenth of employment was in industry an d an unem ployment c ompen sation law whe n only
one-sixth of workers were industrial.  (The second panel of Table 3 indicates dates of adoption of currently valid
legislation.)
Table 3. Enactment of First Employment Laws
Type of Law Spain Italy France
Old age, Disability & Death
1919 1919 1910
Sickness/Maternity 1929* 1912* 1928
1942** 1943**
Work Injury 1900 1898 1898 
Unemployment 1919 1919 1905
Family Allowances 1938 1937 1932  
* Maternity law 
** Sickness law
Current Legislation Effective Date
Type of Law Spain Italy France
Old age, Disability & Death 1985 1962-1995 1945-1993 
Sickness/Maternity 1995 1950-1971* 1945-1978
1962**
Work Injury 1994 1965 1946-1972
Unemployment 1994 1939-1991 1946-1984 
Family Allowances 1994 1961-1988 1946  
Note: When a period of time is listed, the beginning year is the current law in place and the end year is the date of the last amendment to the law.
* Maternity law 
** Sickness law
Source: Social Security Programs Throughout the World — 1999; p. 130 - p. 133; p. 188-190; p. 330-332.
PAY AND BENEFITS SYSTEMS TODAY      
Following is a detailed account of the pay systems in Spa in, Italy, and Fran ce. The S tate control ov er the details
in these systems rev eal the role tha t historical socia l volatility played in  the systems’ developments.  The designs of these
systems also reflect the governments’ strong interest in appeasing workers; in some cases they have presently become
so costly as to req uire reform. A lthough some benefits may seem excessive and even partly to blame for any evident
econom ic crisis, particularly from an employer’s point of view, one must consider these countries’ histories  and the
social, political, and economic environments from which their pay systems were created.
A. Spain: Pay and B enefits
In Spain, The W orkers’ Statute spec ifies the basis  of payment for employees: “by unit of time, by unit of work,
mixed payments, payment for completed tasks, and proportional payments.” (Soler, 1992) Most salaries are based on
payment of time which does not include quantity of output. Payment by unit of work is based on quantity of work
produced, not time spent on production. Mixed salaries are the two combined. Payment for tasks is based on completing
a specified amount of work in a set amount of time, and the period of time ends upon co mpletion of the tasks.
Proportional pay plans are those  based on  the profits of the c ompan y. Recently  Spanish employers have shifted from a
strict pay structure to more variable payment plans for their employees. A 1991 survey by Price Waterhouse and
Crayfield  (ESADE) found that 60 percent of companies responding  have introd uced pa y  systems with grea ter flexibility
(Soler and Filella, 1992).
Spanish employees are guaranteed basic rights as to how they are paid. Pay must be on-time and accompanied by
a pay-slip. It can be pa id period ically but canno t exceed o ne-month inte rvals and infring ement of this  law by a company
guarantees the emplo yee a 10%  interest payme nt on the amo unt past due . Pay differentia ls are related to length of service,
travel expe nses, expo sure to dan gerous sub stances, shift work  and the co st of living in an island  province.1
Pay determination is formal and legally regulated  in Spain. The process takes place at different levels of collective
bargaining. Collective a greements a re reached  at the sector lev el on nationa l or regional b asis and at the individual
company level. The a greements c over bo th pay and w orking con ditions. Th e negotiating p arties involved decide the
length and content of each new contract. The company level negotiators are:
! the works committee
! union representatives, if they exist and form the majority on the works committee
! the management of the company or their legal representatives
The sector level negotiators are:
! the most rep resentative un ion at state or au tonomo us comm unity level2
! trade unions having a minimum of ten percent of the members of works committee or personal delegates in the
geograp hical or functio nal area in whic h the agreem ent will apply
! industry associations which have the membership of ten percent of firms in the area affected by the agreement
and which in addition employ at least ten percent of the workers in the area
Minimum Wages
The governm ent in Spain regulates the minimum wage. Periodically the minimum wage is regula ted accor ding to
the age of workers.  Currently for workers of eighteen years of age and older the minimum wage is 1775 pesetas/day or
53,250 pesetas/month ($1.0 0 = app roximately 1 28.7 pe setas or $3 .23 in dolla rs). For emp loyees living in the fa mily
home who are paid on an hourly basis, the minimum for workers over eighteen is 413 pesetas/hour.
The Wage  Guarantee Fund guarantees at least partial pay if a business fails and a compan y is unable to p ay their
employees due to insolv ency. The  fund is not as imp ortant now a s it used to be b ut was originally d esigned to c ompen sate
workers who lost their jobs. Employers finance the fund by paying four percent of the base used to calculate social
security payments  for unemployment benefits, sickness, and accident at work benefits. (Olea and Rodriguez-Sando, 1988)
Overtime work is not legally authorized for workers under age eighteen or during night shifts, except under
officially legalized exceptional circum stances. Overtime  payment is o ften monetar y or extra time o ff and is negotiated
during collective bargaining. If extra holidays are chosen they must represent at least 75 percent of the time value of the
overtime. Eighty hours is generally the overtime maximum for each worker per year unless overtime is needed d ue to
unforeseen circumstanc es which is define d through c ollective bar gaining. Spa in’s level of overtim e is low and refle cts
high unemployment levels. The maximum is frequently worked in many areas and is an area being targeted for reform.
(Soler and Filella, 1992)
It is illegal to discriminate pay on the basis of “origin, civil status, sex, social conditions, religious or political
convictions, union membership, blood ties with any other employee, or language” according to the Spanish constitution.
Job evaluation is commonly used  in Spain. Unions have p ut significant pressure on companies to use objective pay
systems. In fact most negotiated contracts require pay to be based on job co ntent. Currently job  evaluation is p rimarily
used for supervisors, technicians, salaried employees and manual workers. (Soler and Filella, 1992)
The new est develop ment in Spa in’s variable  pay systems has been the use of incentive pay. Managers are often
given incentives more often than other employees are. Howev er, many co mpanies a re beginning  to provide b onuses to
all employees based on either merit or performance. These bonuses are generally used as short-term incentives.  Group
bonuses are less popular in Spain. Spanish companies are required to make thirteen and fourteen month bonus pa yments.
One payment is in the  summer an d one is in D ecembe r. This bo nus structure is  popular with employees and employers.
Employees like it because they receive a lump sum payment that they would not likely otherwise have accumulated on
their own for co stly vacation and holiday seaso ns. Employers like it because they are ab le to collect interest on the sum
until the bonuses are granted to the employees. (William M. Mercer Companies, 1992)
Tax
Income tax in Spain is based on a “sliding scale.”  This scale takes into consideration the number of children an
employee has and his or her level of income. These two factors predict the percent of taxes a citizen is requ ired to pay.
Currently,  at the minimal level there is no tax on income less than 927,000 pesetas, and the maximum percentage of tax
is 42 percent for a single person without children earning more than 16,538,000 pesetas per year. This percentage is the
lowest amongst the Latin European countries; the m aximum in F rance is 56 .8 percent and in Italy it is 51 percent. Every
citizen is required to  pay income tax annually. Taxes must also be paid on any additional income sources and any
currently held  assets. (Soler and Filella, 1992)
Social Security
The Spanish so cial security system is very comprehensive.  Employers and employees must make annual
contributions based on rates determ ined annually bases on categories of risk. The percent deducted is based on an
employees base wage, not additional income such as expenses or benefits. Certain professions have minimum and
maximum levels of de-ductions. (Soler and Filella, 1992 and William M. Mercer Companies, 1992)
Employers’ social security contributions are considera bly higher than employees’ contributions. Both employer
and employee contributions a re tax deductible. Emp loyers’ social security contribution rate (excluding work ers’
compensation) is 23.6 per cent of all earnin gs. Emplo yees’ contribu tion rate is 4.7  percent of earnings.  These percentages
are based on wage classes that vary according to occupational classes. Employers pay an additional contribution for
workers’ compensation, dep ending on  the industry, in the ra nge of .81 to  16.2 pe rcent of payro ll. (Social Sec urity
Administration, 1997) S ocial security  and unem ployment b enefits are treate d as earned  income b ut perman ent disability
pensions are tax exempt. (William M. Mercer Companies, 1992)
Spain  has had a family allowance program since 1938. They have a contributory program and non-contributory
program. As explained in Social Security Programs around the World-1997, the government funds the non-contributory
program and employees and employers share contributing to the contributory fund. A fam ily receives 36,000 pese tas a
year for any child under the age eighteen. The amount increases if a child  is disabled in a ny way. The more disabled the
child is, the larger the benefit the family receives.
Pensions
Spain  has a contributory and a non-contributory pension system. An “age and invalidity insurance” pension  is also
available  for those not qualified under the social security system. To qualify for a contributory p ension an employee m ust
meet the following re quiremen ts: be registered  with the social sec urity service, be already making contributions, be
working, and have reached age 65. Retirement is possible at age 60 for artists, bullfighters, and railway workers who have
met performance requirements or worked a certain length of time. (Soler and Filella, 1992)
Retirement age can be lowered for employees involved in “difficult, dangerous or unhealthy work.” (Social
Security  Administration, 1992 ) For early re tirement, pen sions are red uced by eig ht percent p er each year  of early
retirement. T ypical occu pations co nsidered d ifficult, dangerous,  or unhealthy are miners, airline workers, and railway
workers. To qualify for benefits an employee must have contributed fifteen years and at least two years must be during
the eight years immediately preceeding the date of retirement. The amount of pension a worker is entitled to is based on
the number of years during wh ich he or she has made  contributions.
Sickness Benefits
All sickness benefits provided in Spain are available through the social security system. The benefits covered are
for “transitory incapacity for work, for provisional invalidity, and for permanent invalidity.” (Soler and Filella, 1992)
The amou nt of benefits available to employees is dep ended on the de gree of illness.
Matern ity leave is considered to be “transitory incapacity to work,” and is regarded the same as other sicknesses.
Matern ity coverage is 100 percent for sixteen weeks unless there is a multiple birth and then it is extended two more
weeks. (Social Security Administration, 1997) Social security begins on the 16th day of sickness. The employee must
have contributed  180 da ys in the last five years to  be qualified  for benefits  covering   commo n illness. If the illness is
work related, there is no minimum contribution required.
Benefits  in the case of illness are payable on the first day of illness at a 75 p ercent rate o f social security  earnings.
For normal sickness the benefit is 60 percent of social security earning from the 16th  to the 21st d ay. (Social Se curity
Administration, 1997) Benefits can be paid up to one year with the possibility of extension for another six months. If after
this time an employee is still unable to work and is under a doctor’s care, benefits can continue for up to 30 months.
(William M. Mercer companies, 1992)
The Employer is responsible for payment of all social security benefits between the 1st  and 15th day of sickness
except where the cause of sickn ess is work-relate d. All actual medical care is taken care at hospitals and clinics through
the National Institute of Social Security. Physicians and clinics must be under contract through the National Institute of
Social Security. Physicians and clinics must be under contract with the institute to service patients covered through social
security. All care cov ered with  social security b enefits are gene ral medica l, dental, prescriptions, lab work, maternity care
and hospitalization. Patients pay 40 perce nt of all prescription costs unless being treated in a hospital, in which case the
cost is fully covered. (Social Security Administration, 1997)
Holidays and Vacations
Spain  celebrates tw elve nationa l holidays annu ally, plus two loca lly variable holidays making a total of fourteen.
In Spain  employees are guaranteed 2.5 days of vacation per month. Each worker averages approximately six weeks of
vacation a year not including holidays. (Soler and Filella, 1992)
Other Benefits
A common practice is Spain is allowing employees to receive firm  produc ts at a reduce d price or  at cost. Examples
are discounted railway tickets, airline tickets, or cars at cost in the relevant industry. Lunch canteens are also common
practice for employees. At the director level fringe benefits are very com mon such  as cars or tuition  reimbursem ent.
Fringe benefits are considered taxable income in Spain.
Other benefits which are often prov ided are lo ans, medica l check-ups, sp orts facilities, scholarships for children,
occasional stock op tions or profit sharing, life insurance, chauffeur, and club mem berships.
B.  Italy: Pay and Benefits
Italy has a highly structu red, sector-d riven pay system that plac es great emp hasis on the em ployment se curity.
Unlike in Spain and France, this system permits a wide range of minimum wages, governed by national and company
collective contracts, and individual contracts that supplement co llective agreements on a case-by-case b asis.
Compensation to workers is often at an hourly rate or a monthly calculation. (Cooper and Giacamello, 1992)
Emplo yer’s associations a nd unions n egotiate  collective contracts. Basic worke rs’ rights are established through
the collective co ntract in regard s to fair pay, max imum wor king hours (4 8 per wee k), weekly rest, annual holidays,
occupational safety, sickness be nefits, maternity be nefits, and notice  of termination periods. The Italian constitution states
all established standards of a collective contract must be applied to the involved parties, though the principle has not
passed into law. At the statutory level only  the specific employer’s association and union are bound by the collective
contract.  Courts gen erally apply the constitutional principle to the entire sector regardless of membership in the
employers’ associations and unions. (Cooper and Giacamello, 1992) At the national level collective agreements are
negotiated by sector. The national level also  includes inter-co nfederation al agreeme nts that address wage indexation, the
cost of labor, and training. National agreements also provide employment statistics to unions relevant to the workers of
a sector. Th is information is often used for strategic planning. Each plant is allowed to make up supplementary collective
contracts  individually. These contracts detail the minimum and/or general provisions outlined in the national ag reement,
especially reg arding pay le vels. 
Collective agreements are negotiated for certain time periods. They generally run for two to four years. During
negotiations, if an agreement cannot be re ached between e mployers and unions the g overnment may intervene  as a
mediator. The co llective contra cts specifically outline the minimum c ost of living increa ses paid ev ery six months. T his
is an extremely important element of the contract to all parties involved. (Cooper and Giacamello, 1992)
Individual contracts can be established between individual employees and the company. The individual contract
is a supplem ent to the collective c ontract. It can o nly suppleme nt the contrac t rather than cha nge it in any way, an d it is
meant to be a ben efit to the employee. Individual co ntracts need not be as spec ific as collective contracts. The individual
contract is not only a financ ial “supplem ent” but can also include specific tasks, responsibilities and possibly a job
description.
Salaries in Italy are negotiated in terms of “take home” or net pay. There are four elements of gross wages and
salaries of all employees. The first is the minimum wage which is established under the collective agreement. The second
element of pay is the bi-annual, automatic cost of living increases. The third element of pay is the practice of paying a
thirteenth monthly salary e ach year whic h is commonly paid at Christmas and is known as a one-time bonus. Some non-
industrial sectors pay a fourte enth month  bonus that is usu ally paid in the sum mer. The  thirteen and fo urteen mo nth
bonuses are always negotiated in the collective c ontract. Fina lly, the fourth eleme nt of pay is  the monthly pay negotiated
in the individual contract in addition to the collective contract minimum. The minimum supplement cannot be negotiated
“down” once it is agreed upon. (Cooper and Giacamello, 1992)
Wag e Levels
The minimum  wage is established through the terms of the collective contract. The Italian constitution established
an Italian worker’s right to “just pay” relative to the quality of the work performed that is adequate  to provide  for their
family. The wage can vary from sector to sector.
There are four specific categories of emp loyees in Italy. They are directors and se nior managers, manage rs,
technical or skilled staff and skilled and unskilled workers. In collective agreements unions will set the responsibilities
attached to each catego ry and every employee w orks in one of the categories.
The Italian averag e gross salary p er month  is estimated at 2,050,000 lire ($1 = 1,509 lire). Generally, the minimum
salary for senior managers and director, not including the thirteen or fourteen-month bonus, ranges between 61,000,000
and 80,000,000 lire p er year. A rec ent newspa per survey sta ted that com pany direc tors in Rom e can receiv e slightly
higher compensation than their counterparts in Milan. The reasons are unclear. Speculation is that Milan has a higher
cost of living than Ro me. Gen erally speakin g, the elemen ts of pay can vary on a case by case basis but the ratio of
variable  pay usually acc ounts for ab out thirty-five perc ent of total salary.  Overtime is also negotiated in all the collective
contracts. The usual maximum hours allowed per week is twelve hours. (Cooper and Giacamello, 1992)
Laws have been  instituted regard ing pay discrim ination and e qual pay in Italy. In 1977 a law on equality in the
workplace was established. In 1991 the Italian government established laws on affirmative action and sexual
discrimination. These laws guarantee women pay and benefits equal to those received by men. The labor supply of
women has continued to grow since WWII but currently women hold less than ten percent of government management
positions and even fewer women hold management positions in private firms. (Cooper and Giacamello, 1992)
Job evaluations are not legislated except in the larger companies or they can be considered  on an individual basis.
The wage index ation system ac ts as an automatic system of wage adjustment and mak es evaluations for wage-increase
largely redundant. Objective pay scales are becoming increasingly necessary in Spain and Italy to decrease pay
discrimination.
Pay for performance or incentive pay is negotiated in individual contracts. They are most often used in the
commercial sector, especially in sales, and they are generally not us ed in the man ufacturing secto r. When  they are paid
they are often pa rt of the thirteen o r fourteen mo nth salary bon us. Comp ulsory profit sha ring does no t exist in Italy,
though some is  done on a voluntary basis. Commissions are common practice in sales positions. (Cooper and Giacamello,
1992: 337)
 
Tax
There are three inco me taxes in  Italy: corporate, personal and local income tax. Both employer and employees pay
taxes. Individual income tax must be paid annually based on the traditional calendar ye ar. Comp anies can set up  their
own fiscal year but it must obviously be for a twelve-month period.
There are a few corporate tax-free zones for new companies or companies in depressed areas. These areas are
generally  located in the south. The highest personal marginal tax rate is 51 percent for income above 300,000,000 lire.
For income between 150,000,000 and  300,000,000 lire the tax is 41 percent. (William M. Mercer Companies, 1992)
Italian tax laws are very complicated. Tax evasion is considered one of the key contribu tors to Italy’s nation al debt.
(Cooper and Giacamello, 1992: 336)
Social Security
The National S ocial Secu rity Institute (INP S) covers a ll employee s in the private se ctor over the  age of 14. In  Italy,
social security is not co nsidered a  tax. Agents  separate from the tax authorities administer the INPS. (William M. Mercer
Companies,  1992) Employees making less than 63,054,000 lire contribute 8.89 percent of their earnings. Employees
making more than 63,054,000 lire contribute 9.9 percent o f their earnings. E mployers’ co ntributions are  slightly
complicated. Currently, em ployers mu st contribute 1 9.36 pe rcent of an em ployee’s ear nings if the person was hired
before January 1, 1997. For employees hired after January 1, 1997, an employers must contribute 23.8 percent. As of
January1, 1 999, the ra te will be 23.8  percent for all employers. There is no “grandfather” clause after this date. There
are some industries in which employers pay “a special contribution.” Employers contribute at lower percentag e rate in
“distressed areas.” (Social Security Administration, 1997) E mployer a nd emplo yee contribu tions to social se curity are
tax deductible.
Italy has had a family allowance program established since 1937. As explained in Social Secu rity Programs
throughout the World-1999, family allowances are funded by contributions from the employer. The contribution percent
is continually changing. Currently an employer contributes 4.84 percent of earning for employees hired before 1997. For
any employee hired in 1997 the contribu tion was 2.4 8 percen t, and for emp loyees hired  in 1998 the  contribution  rate is
3.34 pe rcent.
The program is also funded through various government subsidies. The amount of the family allow ance ben efit
varies dependent on the size of the family and their income. Benefits are higher for single parent families and families
with disabled children.
The state unemployment benefit fund known as the CIG (la Cassa In tergraxio ne Gua dagni)  was established in
the 1970s. T he CIG “p rotects work ers’ rights and guarantees em ployee wa ges in the even t that a comp any needs to
suspend production, reduce the number of workers, or in the case of ‘transitory or changeable circumstances’ – such as
market forces, natural disaster, or reorganization.” (Cooper and Giacamello, 1992) The CIG guarantees all employee
wages during a layoff and will co ver 80 pe rcent of the em ployees’ wee kly salaries as an u nemploym ent benefit. T o help
protect themselves from such expenses companies can request two types of  CIG support. “Ordinary” support is used
in times of a temporary crisis and “extraordinary” support is used when a company may have to close. The CIG has
proved to be costly to Italy and is currently a target of government reform. In its current state it is contributing
significantly to the national debt. Reform would put more restrictions and time limits on  when an employer and
employee could  take advantage of the bene fits.
Pensions
Italy’s  government sponsored pensions are based on age and length of service. The pension system is very
complicated. There are three specific categories that qualify emplo yees for ben efits and establish the retirement age. As
quoted from the Social Security Programs throughout the World-1997, the categories are as follows:
Category  One: New entrants to the labor force  as of 1996 . Flexible  retirement ag e: 57- 65. R etirement nec essary.
No seniority pension.
Category Two: Individuals with less than 18 years of coverage under the old law. Up to December 1996, age
62(men) or 57(women) and 17 years of coverage. In 1997, age 63 (men) or 5 8(women) and 18 years. Grad ually
increasing to  age 65(m en) and 6 0 (wome n) with 20 yea rs in 2001. Seniority pension: 40 years of contributions or age
57 and 35 years of contribution.
Category  Three: Individuals w ith more than 18 years of coverage under the old law. Same as Category Two except
that 15 years o f contributions must have been prior to 1992. Seniority pension in 1996 age 52 and 36 years of
contributions gradually rising to 40 years in 2008.
The calculations fo r the pension  payment is  just as complicated as the categories. As quoted form Social Se curity
Programs throughout the World-1997, the calculation per category is as follows:
Category  One: Pension based on amount of accumulated contributions times the coefficient that varies  according
to age, ranging from 4.72 at age 57 to 6.136 at age 65.
 Category Two: Service pr ior to Dec ember 1 995 ba sed on old  coefficients  from .9 to 2 times salary and years of
service. Service after December 1995 is the same as category one.
Category Three: Based on the old coefficients from .9 to 2 times salary and years of service.
An added perk for Italians is that the thirteenth month bonus still continues with their pension. The pension system
in Italy is extremely co stly expense fo r the State  and contrib utes to the cou ntry’s infamous o verall debt. A s it is currently
set up, this expen se is set to become an impossible burden a s the elderly population grows an d Italy’s birth rate declines.
The birth  rate is already the  lowest in Euro pe. As a resu lt, this area is targeted  for reform a s well.
Company pension plans are not yet widespread, except perhaps in the banking sector for historical reasons, and
those that do exist are negotiated on an individual basis. The  current state pension system, however, is one  of the most
generous in Europe. In April 1993 the Government issued the first legislation on private pension plans in Italy. The new
law concerns a ll aspects of a  private pen sion fund: eligib ility, contributions a nd benefits, an d legal and  tax aspects. T his
law applies to existing pension funds that will need to amend their current structure. Under the new law passed  in April
1993, such funds must be financed through a  separate trust fund to which both the em ployer and the emp loyees must
contribute.
New pensio n plan dev elopmen t is expected  to increase d ramatically du e to the redu ction in the soc ial security
coverage, but the curren t legislation doe s not give sufficient ta x incentive to encourage firms to establish company
pension plans. Amendments will need to be made to meet the expectations the law was meant to set. (William M. Mercer
Companies, 1992: 152)
Sickness Benefits
Health has been established as a “funda mental right” of the Italian citizen by the constitution. The const itution
guarantees workers jobs when they are unable to work due to illness. The National Health Service (SSN) was introduced
in 1980  to take respo nsibility for this right’s  enforcem ent. Employment is protected up to 180 days but longer lengths
of time are often negotiated by the collective c ontract. (W illiam M. M ercer Co mpanies, 1 992) A fter this length of time
a company there may use the extended absence as “justified reason” for termination , but these case s are never c ompletely
clear. (Cooper and Giacamello, 1992: 339)
By law workers must provide the employers and the social security origination (INSP) with medical documentation
on their reason for absence and the estimated time of their return to work. Most collective agreements require an
employee to notify the employer on the first day of absence. Sick pay is determined by the collective agreemen t and will
vary accordin g to length of ab sence. Typ ically, employe es receive an  indemnity  funded by the INSP equal to 50 percent
of pay from the  fourth to the 20th day of illness and 66.6 percent from the 21st day to the 180th day. Most national
collective agreements provide supplementary pay protection to cover the difference so the employee can receive 100
percent of his or her salary. This difference is totally funded by the company. (William M. Mercer Companies, 1992)
Holidays and Vacations
Italy has twelve religio us/national ho lidays and five u nspecified h olidays for citi zens since other state holidays have
been eliminated. “Statutory holiday” or vacation time averag es 20-30  days a year p er emplo yee. Vaca tion is always
negotiated in the collective contract. (Cooper and Giacamello, 1992: 340)
Other Benefits
Italy has state-run day care available for working parents. Maternity benefits are also administered through the
National Health Service. Mothers receive 80 percent of their earning for up to two months before and three months after
the baby is bo rn. The N ational He alth Service w ill extend mate rnity leave for either parent by an additional six mo nths.
The employee receives 30 percent of their earning for this extension. (Social Security Administration, 1997) A mother
can take a one-year leave of absence without the fear of losing her job. If she returns to work after three months she may
receive special privileges that are as follows: the right to two hours off per day for one year for the purpose of
breastfeeding and the opportunity to stay home in the event of a child’s sickness until the child is three years old.
“Perks” are genera lly only available to senior management. These fringe benefits are managed through legislation
that drastically limits their tax deductibility. Where applicable, these benefits are granted on a “confidential” basis so
that there is a lack of documentation and information on them. (Treu, 1991)  Company cars are an example of a perk  in
Italy but they are rarely provided under the management level unless they are considered essential to the job. This may
be partially because there are no tax  benefits for companies providing  a care to an employee.
Training courses or short “job-related career breaks” sponsored by the employer are becoming very po pular in
Italy. There are three reasons this is occurring. First, the unions and companies promote training workers. Second, the
company benefits financially from increases in employee production and the broadening of their skill level. Third, giving
this type of perk is tax deductible for the company yet provides a “mini” vacation for the employee.
Vouchers are anothe r perk found  in Italy. Most collective agreements provide for luncheon vouchers in companies
with over 100 employees or reimbursement of cash if the employee chooses not to use the voucher. M any large pub lic
sector companies p rovide recreational facilities to their employees. T his is not a common pra ctice in smaller firms.
C. France: Pay and Benefits
Collective bargaining and negotiations are the standard practice in France. The different levels a contract can be
negotiated at are by company, branch, professional or inter- professional levels and can be applied locally, regiona lly,
or nationally. Recognized trade unions handle all negotiations on behalf of employees nationally and at the individual
firm level. Negotiations are also carried out on behalf of the employers by employers’ unions, associations, or other
groupings . 
There are certain d istinctions amo ngst collective a greements  in France. There are three specific French collective
agreeme nts. The first type  covers “all  conditions and guarantees”. The second type covers “a certain set of conditions
and guarantees.” Finally, the third type addresses “special cases involving compulsory negotiations” at the individual
firm level (pro bably what would be called profit sharing in the United States) which take place once a year but do not
require a company to pro mise results from negotiations. Employers tend to favo r agreeme nts that cover o nly certain
conditions since they are supposed to be easier to adapt to a firm. (Bournois, 1992: 148)
Minimum Wages
The SMIC (Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel de Croissance or Minimum  Interprofess ional Gro wth Wage ) is
guaranteed to all eligible workers. There is one minimum wage, unlike Spain and Italy, and the French minimum wage
is based on the cost of living and the g eneral economic situation. An y increase of at least two percent in the cost of living
is followed by an automatic inc rease in the m inimum wag e, which is a uniq ue way for the g overnme nt to increase the
minimum wage above the rate of inflation. What makes it unique is that the minimum wage increase is automatic. The
SMIC is reviewed every year and is linked to economic growth.
Compensation consists of a salary or wage, in addition to bonuses and/or fringe benefits. A salary is negotiated
on a yearly basis. Salaries must conform to the legal limits and conditions set within  the pertinent industry or sector. It
is illegal to index p ay to the SM IC, to general l evels of price s or to goo ds and serv ices not related  to the firm itself.
(Bournois, 1992)
There are severa l forms of bonuses:
! In public contact positions all or part of an employee’s wages can be made up of tips
! Room and board
! Doub le month pa y or thirteen-mo nth pay,  vacation bonuses and  so on a re com monly prac ticed. The se operate
according to the individually agreed contracts, collective contracts or by the employer’s initiative.
! Rewards for long service and hard work
! Profit-sharing bonuses due to ind ividual performance. T hese are often set as merit bonuses.
Forty percent of French companies pay bon uses on an ind ividual basis a nd 40%  of those bo nuses are for c ertain
categories of employees only. (Bournois, 1992: 149)
Disparities in pay that cannot be explained by the differences in performances or requirements of a job exist in
France, Italy and Spain, even though some laws exist prohibiting disparity. There is a substantial gap in pay between men
and women in France. The gap worsens the higher the level of a position.
Profit  sharing plans are required for firms with over 50 employees. These plans are negotiated by collective
contract.  The co mpany is req uired to  reserve part of its profits for employees as long as the profits in a given year exceed
five percent of the shareholders’ equity. Employees’ shares are distributed according to salary level through dual ceiling;
the first ceiling is on the profit share calculated propor tionally on the sa lary, and the second is on the percentage of share
capital that may be he ld. Profits are d istributed ann ually unless otherwise stated. It is an option to transfer one ’s profit
share into stock or put in a company savings plan. Company savings plans are optional profit-sharing plans that
employees can contribute to voluntarily. It is mandatory for companies to make contributions to the company savings
plans.
Tax
The French income tax system is “highly progressive.” (Bournois, 1992) There are seven levels of income tax that
vary from five percent of income to 56.8 percent. French citizens actually pay less income tax than other countries. They
do pay more in national insurance, which is deducted proportionally to their income. Tax and social security make up
their paycheck deductions. (William M. Mercer Companies, 1992)
Social Security
France has an official social security system that is composed of four specific plans (called “schemes”): the general
scheme, the special scheme, the independent scheme, and the agricultural scheme. As explained by Bournois, the scheme
definitions are as follows:
! The general scheme insures emp loyees without a special scheme for “un fortunate” risks or “fortunate” ris ks
(family-related expenses).
! The special scheme protects workers against all risks except in certain industries where it protects only one
particular risk. These industries include employees of the railroad, metro/bus system, and mining industry and
gas industry.
! Independent schemes protect self-employed individuals and provide old age pension, maternity, and sickness
payments.
! The agriculture scheme covers all risks for agriculture employees and does not fall under the independent
scheme.
This welfare system is “diverse yet still suffers from issues with social justice and funding.” (Bournois, 1992)
Funding for the social security system is very complicated. Some services are financed by employers anywhere
from 45 to 50 percent and some by employee s from 15 to  19 percent. It is apparent in France, Spain, and Italy that the
employer shoulders a significantly higher percentage of contribution to social security than the employees do, but French
employees bear two to three times more of a contribution than their counterparts in Italy and Spain. The future of the
system in France depend s on resolving the  funding pro blem; the Fre nch are living lo nger and the  labor supp ly is
decreasing, so the current system is functioning less well. This is a targeted area of reform. (Bournois, 1992)
There are a numb er of benefits av ailable through France’s social security system. The most com mon ben efits apply
to sickness, mate rnity, disablem ent, old age (retirement), death and  widowho od. The re is also com pensation fo r accidents
at work or while traveling as well as job related  illnesses. The re are a num ber of family b enefits such as Fran ce’s child
benefits, family benefits, benefits to large families, housing benefits, and family income support benefits for the start of
the school year. (Bournois, 1992) These benefits are typically called “family allow ances.” (So cial Security
Administration, 1997) The family allowance program has been in effect in France since 1932. It is a very elaborate and
complicated program . As explaine d in Social Security Programs throughout the World-1997, employers fund the
program at 5.4 p ercent and the governm ent at 1. I percent of revenues.
Pensions
There is no  set retirement a ge in France , unlike in Spain  and Italy.  The minimum age in Franc e at which a Sta te
pension is usu ally paid is 60  for both me n and wom en. Retirem ent can be ta ken at any age  between 6 0 and 65  but full
payment of pensions will only be paid upon full contributions of 37.5 years to 40 years depending on the work er’s date
of birth and retirement. R etirement ma y be deferre d past age 6 5 but no inc rease is made if the full contributory period
is met. (William M. Mercer Companies, 1992)
A distinctive feature in the French benefits system is  the mandatory membership of programs  which operate on
pay-as-you-go basis and supplement social security benefits. Employees are designated into four areas: blue collar or
clerical workers, jun ior superviso rs, supervisors with technical or academic qualifications, a nd senior e xecutives. B enefits
from these prog rams are finan ced throug h multi-emplo yer or industry-w ide institutions and  have set minim um
contribution rates. The level of pension accrued under these plans is highly dependent on the salary progression of the
individual worker; the higher the final salary, the lower the pension as a percentage of the final earnings. (William M.
Mercer Companies, 1992)
Sickness Benefits
The State pays a daily sickness benefit that is equal to half of workers’ earnings be ginning the fourth day of illness.
This increases to two thirds from the 31st day if the insured has three or more children. To receive short term benefits
employees must have paid contributions over the last six months on earnings equal to at least 1,015 times the minimum
wage (SMIC ) or comp leted 200  hours of em ployment in th e three mo nths preced ing the illness. (W illiam M. M ercer
Companies, 1992)
If an illness lasts longer than six months or a permanent disability is declared then certain conditions must be met
to receive benefits. Paid contributions over  the last 12 months on earning equal to at least 2,030 times the minimum wage
must have been made or the ill person must have registered with social security for the last twelve months and completed
800 hours of employment in the first twelve months preceding disability . It is commo n practice fo r compa nies to
supplement State sickness benefits  with private plans which often cover up to 80 percent of earnings after a specified
waiting perio d established  in the collective c ontract.
Holidays and Vacations
France has sixteen paid holidays per year and guarantees 25-30 days of vacation time.
Other Benefits
Fringe benefits such as company ca rs, loans, and accommodation are usually treated as salary under French law,
thus subject to income tax. T his is consistent with Spain. The most  tax effective benefits include group supplementary
insured retirement and risk benefit plans, obligatory profit sharing and a voluntary gain sharing plans, company saving
plans and stock option plans. (William M. Mercer Companies, 1992: 102)
Table 4.  Overview of the Three Latin Systems
Benefit Spain Italy France
Collective Employee Employee Employee and
Bargaining Employer 
Minimum Wage Structured pay and Structured pay and Structured pay and
variable pay variable pay variable  pay 
Overtime Allowed  80 hours per year 12 hours per week negotiated in each
collective contract 
Pay Discrimination  Yes Yes Yes
Law
Job Evaluation Yes Yes  Unknown  
Tax  Sliding scale- Maximum is 51% Maximum is 56.8%
maximum is 42% of earnings of earnings
of earnings       
Social Security Employee: 4.7% Employee: 8.89-9.9% Employee: 15-19%
Employer: 23.6%  Employer: 19.36-23.8% Employer: 45-50% 
Worker’s   Employer: .81%- Employer: .5%-16% Employer: average 2.26%
Compensation 16.2%; average 1.98% average 3% dependent on risk 
dependent on risk dependent on risk
Sickness  Employer: 1st-15th day SNN pays 50% !st- State pay 50% 4th - 30th
Social Security: 16th 20th day; 66.6% 31st - day; 66.6% 31st -  180th
day-one year 180th day day
Coverage: 60% from Employer: supplements Employer: supplements
the 4th - 20th day SNN up to  180 days State up to 80% of
75% from the 21st Extension available earnings
day-one year dependent on severity Extensions  available
Can be extended up of illness and certain dependent on severity
to 18 months qualifiers of illness and certain
(30 months for special qualifiers
Materni ty  
Social Security: 100% SNN: 80% 2months State: 100%;  time varies
for 16 weeks; before birth and 3 Dependent on number of
18 weeks for multiple months after birth; children in the family
births additional 6 months and number of  children
for either parent needing care; t ime varies
at 30% from 24  weeks before
birth to 22  weeks after
birth
Benefit Spain Italy France
Nationa l Holiday 14 12 plus 5 floating 16 
Vacation average 6 weeks   average 4-6 weeks  average 5-6 weeks
a year a year a year  
Note: Pensions and Family Allowances are very complicated to cover briefly in this chart. Please refer to each individual section for specifics in
each country.
CONCLUSION
A synoptic overview of the central elements of the European Latin compensation systems appears in Table 4 .  This
provides a quick summary of the detailed discussions of Section 3.
In conclusion, it is evident that history inevitably engineers the present. Spain, Italy, and France have many
similarities and differences in  their pay systems that have resulted, at least to some extent, from their backgrounds. Each
has a relatively complex pay system closely regulated by the State, for ex ample, be cause of their  histories of conflict and
struggle; the complexity seems to reflect these countries’ governmental attempts to try and avoid  further social and
political upset.  Thus, the simple compensation world of “wages alone” was displaced early on through state intervention.
 This early complexity  has continued to grow over time as described in this paper, consistent with the Dunlop-Rothbaum
Hypothe sis (1955).  This can be seen to a further extent wh en comp aring Franc e’s relative dev elopmen t to that of Spain
and Italy and how France seems to have served as a role model for the other two  countries’ qu ests for reducing industrial
stresses leading  to class and ind ustrial conflict.
ENDNOTES
1. The island provi nces include the Canary and Balearic Islands. Also included in  the adjustment are working in Ceuta and Melilla, Spain’s
North African enclaves (the minimum supplement in the latter province is 25 percent of base salary). (Soler and Filella, 1992: 466)
2. “For unions to qualify as the most representative at state level they must have at least ten percent or more of the works committee members
or personal delegates as members, or a total membership of at least 15 percent of all union members.” (Soler and Filella, 1992: 466)
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